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for is a nullity." Such practice was not a usurpation of the functions of
the jury thereby infringing the right guaranteed by the Constitution. The
amount of excess in this case did not imply that the jury was influenced
by passion or prejudice in their finding.
EmGA I. KING

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Interstate Divorce
In the Esti'z and Krege cases the United States Supreme Court
held that an ex parte divorce decree could not -terminate a prior alimony
decree granted 'by another state. The Nevada decree denying alimony
was not entitled to fall faith and credit, although the part of 'the decree
which terminated the marital status was so entitled. The argument 'has
been made that the Nevada decree was defective only because Nevada
had failed to give full faith and credit to the prior New York alimony
decree, and -therefore -the Nevada decree denying alimony would be entitled to credit where there was no prior decree. This argument was
rejected by -the Ohio Supreme Court in the Armstronge case, which held
that the ex-wife could -bring an alimony only action -in Ohio, although
the marital status -had been ,terminated by a valid Florida divorce entered
before -the wife sued in Ohio. The Armstrong case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court and the same argument was made. As
pointed out in last year's survey article, the Supreme Court decided the
case on other grounds and ducked the constitutional 'issue.4 This year
the same issue was again presented to the Supreme Court, and -this time
the Court approved 'the position that the Ohio court took in the Armstrong case. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt5 the court upheld a New York
alimony decree rendered after the husband divorced the wife in a Nevada
ex parte proceeding. The scope of 'the decision 'is not dear in one respect. The majority opinion assumes that the wife was domiciled in
New York at 'the -time of the divorce. Justice Harlan dissented, pointing
out -that the New York court had not passed on the issue, and that any
state, except New York, should be bound by the Nevada decree.
1

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
'Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
'Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954).
'Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956). See 1956 Survey, 8 WEsT. REs.
L. REv. 308 (1957).
5354 U.S. 416 (1957). See Comment, Vanderbilt and Beyond: Choice of Law in
Interstate Post-Divorce Support Actions, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 69 (1957).
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It seems to me unfortunate that this Court should permit spouses
divorced by valid decrees to comb the country, after the divorce, in search
of any state where the divorcing spouse has property and which has favorable support laws, in order there to obtain alimony, I would therefore by
no means hold the Nevada adjudication "void" and therefore of no effect in

any state

This problem was not present in 'the Armstrong case, nor was at discussed
in the New York Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court majority opinion in Vanderbilt. Certainly the broad language used in the majority
opinion 'mplies -that the Nevada decree denying alimony was absolutely
void. From this, I would assume that -there -is
nothing in the constitution
which prohibits a state from treating the right of support as a transitory
cause of action, and from permitting -the defendant to be sued wherever
he may be found.
In Cunningham v.Cunntngham7 -the parties were divorced -in California and custody of the child was awarded to the mother. The father
sued in Ohio to enforce his visitation 'rights under the California decree.
The Supreme Court held that where the mother and child are now domiciled in Ohio, Ohio does -not have to recognize ;he California decree,
but could redetermine the issues of custody and visitation. Surprisingly,
'the Ohio Supreme Court did not cite the decision of the United States
Supreme Court an the Halvey case 8 which is directly in point. The Court
held that a custody decree which was subject to modification where made
was not entitled to full faith and credit, and could be modified -in the
state where one parent and the child lived. In the instant case, it is
clear that the California decree could -be modified an the court where
rendered, and therefore could be modified in Ohio.
Divorce
1. Procedure
The courts -have often stated 'that a divorce action -is more than a
mere controversy between private parties, and 'that the state as a party to
every divorce proceeding. If this is true, 'the court should not be limited
to the evidence antroduced by the parties, 'but should 'be free to collect
evidence on its own - any evidence which is relevant 'to the marital
history.9 A recent court of appeals case represents a short step in the
'Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 434 (1957).
"166 Ohio St. 203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1957). Accord as to full faith and credit and
child custody decrees, Bain v. Rose, 103 Ohio App. 297, 145 N.E.2d 319 (1957).
'New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
'As to divorce actions involving children under 14, this policy is reflected in the
mandatory divorce investigation act, OHiO REv. CODE § 3105.08.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

Uune

tight direction. In the Weikert' ° case the wife entered a general denial
to the husband's petition charging gross neglect. The -trial court strictly
limited the evidence and scope of cross-examination to the narrow issue
of whether there was gross -neglect during the period just prior to separation, and denied the wife permission to testify or cross-examine relative
fo the underlying causes of the marital breakup. The court of appeals
held that this narrow approach, while justifiable in some civil cases, was
prejudicial error. The court said "The issue before the court is simply
stated. What was the cause of -the separation of these parties after a
marital relationship of nearly twenty years?""
In Ward v. Ward'2 it was held that -the statute permitting the court
of appeals -to award temporary alimony on the appeal of a divorce case,
also permitted the award on the appeal of a decree modifying a preexisting alimony order. The court did not discuss the constitutionality
of the statute, which3 was the -issue -in Beach v. Beach, discussed in last
year's survey article.'
2. Grounds for Divorce and Defenses
There was only one unusual case on cruelty as a ground for divorce.14
In the opinion, the court agreed to "reluctantly elaborate" on the plaintiff's claim that her husband was a sexual pervert who forced or persuaded her to collaborate with him. Recognizing that there were no
Ohio cases on the subject, the plaintiff argued that to deny her relief
would 'have the effect of judicially approving sodomy and other similar
conduct. The court denied -the divorce, concluding that -the acts were
not against .the will of the plaintiff. Perhaps .the underlying rationale
the court:
of the decision is found in one of 'the concluding remarks of
15
"It is not unfair to observe -that -the parties lack gentility."'
There are -two interesting court of appeals decisions on defenses to a
divorce action. Generally, both condonation and recrimination are defenses which will 'bar any divorce, at least where pleaded. In Ohio,
three of -the grounds for divorce are "annulment" grounds, i.e., they relate to defects in the formation of the marriage, rather than to events
*hich happen later. The three grounds are fraud, impotency and bigamy.
In a case of first impression, the court in the Kontner'6 case held that
10

Weikert v. Weikert, 143 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).

'Id.
1

at 865.

140 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).

0 134 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), See 1956 Survey, 8 WEsT.
310 (1957).
"'Johnston v. Johnston, 143 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio C.P. 1957).

'Id. at 500.
"

Kontner v. Kontner, 139 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).

Rns. L. Rv.
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-the defenses would not be applied where the ground for divorce was.
-bigamy. Both husband and wife pleaded and proved -that at the time of
the marriage -the other spouse was already married .to someone else, and
it was pleaded and proved that the partdes had lived together after the
filing of -the petition. The divorce was granted .to the husband, although
where both parties are guilty of bigamy, the logical thing would be to
grant each party a divorce from .the other.
The doctrine of recrimination is harsh enough in the situation where
one spouse wants a divorce and the other does not. It is even harder to
defend a rule which would require the denial of a divorce where both
parties are guilty of some misconduct, and -both spouses desire a divorce.
For this reason it is generally held in Ohio and elsewhere that recrimina17
tion -is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. In Lewis v. Lewis
,the court applied the recrimination rule 'to deny a divorce in an uncontested case. The wife sued for divorce on the ground that her husband was serving a ten year term in prison. After she -ested her case,
and in response to a question from the court, she admitted -that she had
become 'the mother of an illegitimate child after her husband went to
prison. The public policy of Ohio is to promote family unity and harmony, and the denial of the divorce in 'this case does affect this policy.
The happy family -is left intact; the husband in prison, the mother on
the outside, presumably still living with her boy friend, and the child
judicially labeled "bastard" in an uncontested case.
3. Grant of Alimony
Ohio Revised Code § 3105.18 provides that in fixing alimony, the
court may consider among other factors "the value of real and personal
estate of either, at -the -time of the decree." In Ziegler v. Ziegler's the
Supreme Court held that 'the "estate" which was ,to be considered was
not limited to a legal estate, 'but included equitable interests. At the
-time of the divorce -trial, 'the husband's mother had died naming him as
sole legatee. The will had been probated -but no distribution had been
made and legal tide was still -in the executor. The trial court refused to
admit evidence of the estimated value of the mother's estate, and this was
held ,to be prejudical error.
The Supreme Court has held 'that a divorce decree which orders alimony of "$100 per month until the wife -remarries" automatically terminates on the death of 'the husband. 19 In the same case, -the court, as
dicta, said that alimony cannot continue beyond -the death of the husband
"144 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct App. 1956).
"166 Ohio St. 406, 143 N.E.2d 589 (1957).
"Snouffer v. Snouffer, 132 Ohio St. 617, 9 N.E.2d 621 (1937).
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unless a separation agreement, which is incorporated in the decree, so
provides. In the recent DeMilo20 case -the Supreme Court -repudiated
this statement, and permitted -the alimony to run beyond the death of
the husband, where this was expressly provided for in the decree, even
though the decree was not based on a separation agreement.
The -third Supreme Court case in this area involved the extent to
which a divorce court is 'bound 'by a separation agreement. Early Supreme
Court decisions -indicated -that post-nuptial separation agreements were
valid where the contract was fair, -reasonable and just, considering all the
circumstances. Following this lead, the lower courts in Ohio have felt
free 'to disregard separation agreements where the court found that the
agreement was unfair at the time -the divorce was granted. In 1950, the
Supreme Court upset this line of decisions -in the Meyer2l case and 'held
that the provisions of the agreement respecting alimony are binding on
the divorce count until 'the court affirmatively finds that the agreement
must be rescinded for fraud or mistake, and that the burden is on the
person who attempts to avoid 'the contract. In spite of 'this decision, a
number of lower courts have continued -to set aside support agreements
for unfairness and grant alimony in a manner -inconsistent with the terms
of the contract. In the recent case of Lowman v. Lowman2 2 the Supreme
Court indicated that it -really meant what it said in 'the Meyer case, and
that .the agreement could not be disregarded 'by the divorce court, no
matter how harsh or unfair -it was. In this case both spouses were employed and agreed to separate. Each party expressly waived any right
'to future support or alimony. While the divorce action was pending,
the husband beat the wife so badly 'that she almost died, became unemployable, and incurred large medical bills. The trial court ordered -the
husband to pay temporary alimony and to pay the medical bills. The
court held that the agreement would be disregarded because it was so
unfair. The court reasoned that the wifes expenses and inability to
work were caused by her -husband, and 'the separation agreement contemplated 'by the statute23 must provide for some support, rather than
'total non-support. The court of appeals affirmed, and was then reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court.
Two courts of appeals came to different conclusions as 'to the power
of a court 'to order a division of property 'in an action for alimony alone.
2

'DeMilo v. Watson, 166 Ohio St. 433, 143 N.E.2d 707 (1957).
'Meyer v. Meyer, 153 Ohio St. 408, 91 N.E.2d 892 (1950).
"166 Ohio St. 1, 139 N.E.2d 1 (1956). On the somewhat related issue of the effect of a separation agreement on a life insurance policy in which the wife is the
named beneficiary, see Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Hague, 140 N.E. 2d 89
(Ohio C.P. 1956), commented on in the Insurance Survey article infra.
'3 OHIO REV. CODE § 3103.06.
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The Durham2 4 case in 1922 held that he court had no jurisdiction to
make such an award, since divorce courts had no equitable powers. The
1951 amendment to the divorce statutes specified -that divorce courts do
have equity powers and the Morrison2 5 case holds that a final property
settlement is now authorized by statute in an alimony action. The Hetrick2N case reached the opposite conclusion, on the ground that the marital obligation still exists and any alimony only decree must -therefore remain subject to modification.
4. Child Support and Custody
In Hall v. Hall27 the petition for divorce stated that the parties had
a minor child but did not ask for an order of custody or support. The
court granted the divorce but -the decree was silent as to any provisions
relative to the custody or support of the child. After the expiration of
three terms of court, the wife filed a motion in the original divorce case
asking for custody. The cout of appeals held that the court had never
had jurisdiction over the child, and applied the familiar rule that a court
loses control of its judgments at the end of each term, and cannot vacate,
modify or re-open a case in a subsequent term. Doubtless this is good
law as applied -to normal civil cases, but the decision 'is highly questionable in -he child custody area. The court could have held that jurisdiction over the child attaches as soon as the parents file for divorce, even
though the parents do -not ask for a custody order. This argument is
strengthened by -the mandatory provision of the Code which states that
in every case where a divorce is granted, the court must make provision
for the custody of the child.2 s
The courts of appeals are not in agreement on the power of a trial
court to award custody and support where -the court has denied the divorce or alimony. Two courts -have held that the court has 'no jurisdiction, and two courts 'have held that it does, and 'that it is an abuse of discretion to fail to make such an order. A fifth court has -now lined up
with the former group.29
Although there 'is not much authority in Ohio, other states have
generally held that a divorce court which has both parents before it can
decide questions of custody and child support, even 'though the child is
a permanent 'resident of another state. This majority 'rule was followed
2

Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7, 135 N.E. 280 (1922).
v. Morrison, 102 Ohio App. 376, 143 N.E.2d 591 (1956).
2
Hetrick v. Hetrick, 101 Ohio App. 334, 139 N.E.2d 674 (1954).
= 101 Ohio App. 237, 139 N.E.2d 60 (1956).
SOHIo REv. CODE § 3105.21.
'Lewis v. Lewis, 144 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'Morrison
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by the court of appeals in Bowman v. Bowman, 0 where the child had
never lived in Ohio. In a somewhat similar case, a common pleas court
held that it had jurisdiction to modify a child custody award where both
the mother and child were outside Ohio. The mother was served in
West Virginia, but had been before the court in the original divorce ac.tion.al
5.

2
Modification of Alimony, Support or Custody3

The Ward33 case is an interesting illustration of the factors which a
court will consider in modifying an alimony award. Here the original
decree recited that the husband was to pay a monthly sum, unless the
financial status of the wife is changed. The court held that -the improvement in the husband's financial status would not justify an increase, but
where .the wife could show that her financial status had changed for the
worse, the court could increase the alimony and could then consider both
-the improved status of -the husband and the general devaluation of the
dollar which had occurred since the original decree.
In Stafford v. Stafford34 the husband asked the court to reduce the
monehly payments for child support that he was required to pay under
the original divorce decree. The court held:
(1) The court could modify -the decree, even 'though the original
decree contained no express reservation of power to modify.
(2) The burden of proof is on the party who seeks to modify the
decree.
(3)
The husband is not -prevented from seeking a reduction simply
because he was in arrears on past installments and had been found in
contempt of prior court orders. He was given a chance to explain his
inability to comply with the prior decrees. On this last point, another court
of appeals pointed out that the trial court had discretion -to dismiss a
motion for change of custody, where the petitioner was in arrears on support payments and was unable to justify his failure 'to observe the court
order. 8 5

6. Enforcement of Alimony and Support Decrees
In the Tritto6 case, the wife got an alimony judgment for monthly
101 Ohio App. 400, 139 N.E.2d 679 (1956).
'Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 139 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
'The jurisdiction of an Ohio court to modify a child custody support or alimony
decree rendered in another state is discussed in the first section of this Survey article.
See text at note 7 supra.
'Ward v. Ward, 140 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
139 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio App. 1956).
'Hahn v. Hahn, 144 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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installments in New York. Later, the New York court reduced the unpaid installments to a lump sum judgment, although the husband was
not served and had no notice of the action. His attorney in the first case
was served in the second. The wife then sued in Ohio on the second
New York judgment and the court of appeals affirmed a judgment for
-the plaintiff, pointing out that even if no lump sum judgment -had been
entered in New York, 'the wife could sue in Ohio for the unpaid installments.
Elkind v. Harding 7 raises a novel question which has not previously
been decided 'in Ohio, and which has been -the subject of conflicting decisions in other states. The wife obtained custody of -the child in a
divorce action and. an order for the husband to pay 'her $20 per week
for the support of -the child. The decree also provided that the child
was not -to be.removed from Ohio -without prior permission from the
court. The mother took the child to California in violation of .the court
order, and later sued -in Ohio to reduce unpaid ,installments 'to judgment.
The trial court construed the decree as meaning the husband must pay
support only while the child is in Ohio, and disallowed the claim for
installments which accrued after the move to California. The court of
appeals reversed, giving several reasons for its decision. The principal
reason relied on 'by the court was that unpaid accruals are vested rights
which cannot be modified. This argument seems unconvincing. It is
true that due and owing installments are judgments which are entitled
to full faith and credit, ,but the divorce court now has equity powers and
should be able to apply the "dean hands" -rule'to 'bar a party who is in
contempt of court from enforcing his rights, even if the rights rest on a
judgment. A much better reason, and one mentioned only in passing by
the court, is 'that the guilding policy is the interest of the child. Someone has to support the child and -the legislative policy -is dear that the
primary duty of support rests on the father. While the fact of the
mother's violation of .the court order might 'be considered in a motion
to change custody to the father, or might be considered in this case in a
contempt proceeding initiated -by -the court when the mother seeks to
enforce payment, it should not prevent the child from collecting the support -to which he is entitled.
The -two cases which reached conflicting results on the power of a
wife -to collect alimony from a spendthrift trust are commented on in
the TRusTs survey article in -this issue 38
M

Tritto v. Tritto, 138 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).

p143 NY.E.2d 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).

See text of Trusts Survey artice, infra, at footnotes 5 and 6.
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Husband and Wife39
The Code provides that workmen's compensation death benefits may
40
be paid only to a "member of the family of the deceased employee."
4
In the Evans ' case the claimant married the employee after -the em.ployee's first wife had written saying that she had divorced him. The
fact was -that there had 'been no divorce and the marriage was technically
'bigamous, although entered into in 'good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the claimant could not qualify as a
member of the family. Of course the first wife is also barred because
she was -not living with her husband at -the -time of death, as required by
-the same statute.
Legally a common law marriage is just as good as any other marriage.
The difficulty lies in proving it. Lynch v. Romas 42 points out that this
difficulty may be almost impossible 'to overcome in some situations. The
court of appeals held that where an alleged common law wife attempts
to qualify as a widow of the deceased, the "dead man" statute prevents
her from testifying as 'to the marriage. Although the parties lived together for several years and were known in the community as husband
and wife, the court held that the wife could not testify as 'to any agreement of marriage. Without 'her own testimony, the wife failed to meet
the burden of proving a marriage by clear and convincing evidence.
A court of appeals case on the authority of a wife, as agent, to bind
her husband to a contract is discussed in the AGENCY survey article supra.
Adoption
Two recent cases involve the procedure for adoption. In re Masters,4"
discussed in detail in last year's Survey,44 held 'that the requirement of
the consent of -the mother to the adoption of her child could not be
dispensed with in the absence of dear evidence of willful -neglect. In a
similar case, decided -this year, the Supreme Court repeated the rule of
the Masters case and set aside .the finding of neglect for lack of sufficient
evidence.45 Another case held that 'habeas corpus is a proper remedy
where the natural parent -tries to upset an adoption on the ground that
the consent was forged.46
On pleading a cause of action for alienation of affections see Rittenhouse v. Ritten.

house, 140 N.E.2d ,84 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
'0OHio REV. CODE § 4123.59.
'Evans v. Ind. Corn., 166 Ohio St. 413, 143 N.E.2d 705 (1957).
139 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
3165 Ohio St. 503, 137 N.E.2d 752 (1956).
"1956 Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 317 (1957).
In re Kronjaeger, 166 Ohio St. 172, 140 N.E.2d 773 (1957).
"In re Martin, 140 N.E.2d 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).

